Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Insight: Why China can't and won't save the world-Eng/Sp Version

The following information is used for educational purposes only.

Insight: Why China can't and won't save the world
Sep 23 2011
By Emily Kaiser, Asia Economics Correspondent

(Reuters) - The most China can realistically do for the struggling global economy is to ensure its own growth holds up, and that won't be nearly enough to lift the world.

Visions of China putting its $3.2 trillion in reserves to work by launching another government spending spree or buying up European bonds ignore the political and economic reality that China, like any other country, puts its own needs first.

Right now, China's economy doesn't need more stimulus and its leaders are wary of making bad bets on European debt, which means if conditions worsen in the United States or Europe, China would respond only if and when trouble shows up at home.

But even if you sweep aside domestic considerations and imagine Beijing announced $600 billion in government spending, like it did after the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, there is little chance it could deliver the same economic boost.

What ended the post-Lehman panic was a globally synchronized, massive infusion of government spending and interest rate cuts. The United States and Europe cannot deliver significant doses of either right now, and China alone can't compensate.

"China to the rescue? Mission impossible," said Jun Ma, Deutsche Bank's chief economist for China, based in Hong Kong.

To offset the impact of a 3 percent drop in U.S. and European growth, China would need to increase its own growth by 18 percent, he said.

WHAT CHINA MAY DO

The image of China riding to the world's rescue after Lehman misses a critical point: China's response made sense for China. That it also came at an opportune time for the rest of the world was a bonus.

Back then, China, the United States and Europe were on the same page. Lower interest rates and higher government spending were the logical policy choices in every major economy as confidence evaporated and global trade collapsed.

Not so today.

China's stimulus package carried some unpleasant side effects that are still causing trouble in the economy today. The two biggest issues -- high inflation and heavy local government debts -- argue strongly against Beijing going for a bold new spending plan now.

China's Communist Party prizes stability. Runaway inflation can trigger social unrest. Tales of squandered public money can spark outrage too.

But if conditions worsen abroad and China's own economy shows signs of slowing more sharply than expected, there is some room to ease. The grand total would probably be well shy of the $586 billion post-Lehman package.

Beijing already expects growth to slow next year, and in fact would welcome a modest cool-down to ease inflation. A government official acknowledged earlier this month that 2012 growth may dip below 9 percent for the first time in a decade.

Anything below 8 percent would certainly set off alarm bells. Many economists consider that the minimum needed to generate enough jobs for a rapidly urbanizing population.

Barclays economists recently cut their 2012 growth forecast to 8.4 percent, joining a long list of economists predicting growth will sink close to that critical line.

If that threshold were threatened, China's most likely approach would be to direct spending to areas Beijing has already identified as underdeveloped or in need.

The investment list would probably include building more housing for low-income families, developing agriculture, or perhaps cutting taxes for small- and medium-sized businesses.

For the rest of the world, such measures might mean a bit more demand for building materials and perhaps a slight uptick in consumer spending that benefits multinational companies.

But if the United States or Europe slips into even a mild recession, the lost output would quickly dwarf any incremental Chinese growth.

In 2009, the worst phase of the global recession, U.S. gross domestic product fell 3.5 percent.

Let's say it drops a relatively modest 1 percent in a new downturn. That would work out to about $133 billion, or roughly 23 cents out of every dollar China spent in its last stimulus.

As for buying more European debt or perhaps increasing IMF funding, there is some scope for Beijing to help. But that will involve overcoming strong opposition from some important officials -- not to mention incurring taxpayers' ire should the investments go sour.

"Europe should absolutely not put too high expectations on China," Wei Jianguo, a former Chinese vice commerce minister who now heads a top government think tank, told Reuters in an interview on Thursday.

WHAT ELSE CHINA COULD DO

Ironically, stepping up stimulus spending would take China in the opposite direction from what the Group of 20 has recommended to try to even out imbalances between surplus and deficit countries.

China is often accused of over-investing and doing too little to spur domestic demand. Investment now amounts to almost half China's GDP, higher than even 2008, when Beijing ramped up spending to host the Olympics.

One of the most valuable contributions China could make to rebalance the global economy and lift growth is to let the tightly managed yuan currency rise more rapidly. It appeared ready to do so in August, when the central bank set a series of record-high trading midpoints.

But it pulled back a bit in September. If anything, some investors are now betting that the currency will weaken in the next year, although that also looks unlikely.

A stronger yuan would give the rest of the world a competitive advantage in trade and boost Chinese consumers' spending power. But Beijing is worried that it would hurt its own exporters, who are vital for job creation.

China could also lower interest rates. The People's Bank of China has raised interest rates five times since October, and could conceivably unwind some or all of those moves.

However, Beijing seems reluctant to make that move. Premier Wen Jiabao has insisted that fighting inflation remains the top policy priority. That suggests the most likely central bank course is a pause, not a cut.

WHAT CHINA WON'T DO

As long as price pressures are high, China will play conservatively no matter what the rest of the world might want it to do.

Just as the U.S. Federal Reserve dismissed criticism of its $600 billion bond-buying program by pointing out that a stronger U.S. economy was good for the world, Beijing can argue that a stable China is in everyone's best interest.

Annual inflation was running at 6.2 percent as of August, well above Beijing's target of 4 percent. Five interest rate hikes and nine increases in bank reserve requirements in the past year have not been enough to cool prices.

Too much money finds its way into the economy through non-bank lending. Indeed, some economists warn that China's shadow banking system looks ominously similar to that of the United States before the last financial crisis -- enormous, murky, and loosely regulated.

Flooding the economy with more money through a huge stimulus package would only make matters worse.

Big questions remain over how the last pot of money was spent. Beijing encouraged banks to lend freely to government projects such as railways, airports and roads. Some of the loans have soured, and local government defaults now pose one of the biggest threats to China's growth.

Local governments liabilities amount to nearly 27 percent of China's total annual output, and some economists think as much as a quarter of that total could end up in default.

If Beijing has to bail out those local governments, its pockets suddenly won't look so deep, and the rest of the world's problems would have to wait.

"China's role this time around will be different," said Yi Xianrong, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "China is suffering a big hangover from what it previously did, which has created huge risks in the Chinese economy. The role that China can play is minimal."

(Reporting by Emily Kaiser in Singapore; Additional reporting by Alan Wheatley in London and Kevin Yao in Beijing)

© Thomson Reuters 2011. All rights reserved.

***********************************************************************************************************


Por qué China no puede ni quiere rescatar al mundo


Por Emily Kaiser | Agencia Reuters



SINGAPUR.- Seamos realistas: lo máximo que China puede hacer por la endeble economía global es asegurarse de que su propio crecimiento se sostenga, y eso no será suficiente para levantar el mundo. Aquellos que imaginan que pondrá en acción sus 3,2 billones de dólares de reservas lanzando otra ola de gasto público o comprando bonos europeos ignoran la realidad política y económica de que China, como cualquier otro país, pone en primer lugar sus propias necesidades.

Hoy, su economía no necesita más estímulo y sus líderes son muy cautelosos: no quieren hacer malas jugadas con la deuda europea, lo que significa que, si las condiciones se agravan en Estados Unidos o en Europa, China sólo responderá cuando surjan problemas en su propio territorio.

Pero aun si dejamos de lado las consideraciones domésticas e imaginamos que Pekín anuncia un gasto público de 600.000 millones de dólares, como lo hizo después del colapso de Lehman Brothers en 2008, hay pocas probabilidades de que pueda provocar el mismo estímulo económico que entonces. Lo que puso fin al pánico post-Lehman fue una masiva inyección de gastos gubernamentales sincronizados y recortes de las tasas de interés. Estados Unidos y Europa no pueden hacer ninguna de las dos cosas en este momento, y Pekín solo no puede compensar.

"¿China al rescate? Misión imposible", dijo Jun Ma, el principal economista para China del Deutsche Bank, con sede en Hong Kong.

Para compensar el impacto de una caída del 3% en el crecimiento de Estados Unidos y de Europa, China debería incrementar su propio crecimiento en un 18%, afirmó.

La imagen de China corriendo al rescate del mundo después de la caída de Lehman ignora un punto esencial: la respuesta de China, en ese momento, tenía sentido para China. El hecho de que se produjera en un momento oportuno para el resto del mundo era un plus.

En ese momento, Estados Unidos y Europa estaban al mismo nivel. Tasas de interés más bajas y un mayor gasto gubernamental eran las elecciones políticas lógicas en cualquier economía importante, en momentos en que la confianza se evaporaba y el comercio global colapsaba.

Pero hoy no es así. El paquete de estímulo chino conllevaba algunos efectos colaterales desagradables que todavía causan problemas. Los dos problemas más grandes -la elevada inflación y las pesadas deudas de los gobiernos locales- son fuertes argumentos para que Pekín no implemente ahora un nuevo plan de estímulo.

El partido comunista chino valora la estabilidad. Una inflación desbocada puede desencadenar el malestar social. Y los relatos sobre el derroche del dinero público también pueden provocar indignación.

Pero si las condiciones empeoran en el exterior y la economía china muestra signos de desacelerarse de manera más brusca que la esperada, hay algunas posibilidades de que China actúe. Pero el total del estímulo probablemente no alcanzaría para nada los 586.000 millones de dólares del paquete post-Lehman.

Pekín ya prevé que su crecimiento se desacelere el año próximo, y en realidad le vendría bien enfriar un poco la economía para aliviar la inflación. A principios de este mes, un funcionario del gobierno reconoció que en 2012 el crecimiento podría caer por debajo del 9% por primera vez en una década.

Cualquier cifra por debajo del 8% haría sonar las alarmas. Muchos economistas consideran que ése es el mínimo necesario para generar suficientes empleos para una población que se urbaniza rápidamente.

Si ese umbral se viera amenazado, el enfoque que más probablemente adoptaría China sería dirigir los gastos hacia zonas que Pekín ya ha identificado como subdesarrolladas o en estado de necesidad. La lista de inversiones probablemente incluiría la construcción de más viviendas para familias de bajos ingresos, el desarrollo de la agricultura o tal vez la reducción de impuestos para pequeñas o medianas empresas.

En cuanto a comprar más deuda europea o tal vez incrementar los fondos del FMI, hay cierta posibilidad de que Pekín ayude. Pero eso implicaría superar la fuerte oposición de algunos funcionarios de importancia, para no hablar de la ira de los contribuyentes en el caso de que la inversión saliera mal.

"Europa no debe poner expectativas demasiado altas en China", dijo en una entrevista Wei Jianguo, un ex viceministro de comercio chino.

Una de las contribuciones más valiosas que China podría hacer para volver a equilibrar la economía global y aumentar el crecimiento sería permitir que su moneda, el yuan, estrechamente controlado, aumente con mayor rapidez. Un yuan más fuerte daría al resto del mundo una ventaja competitiva en el comercio y fortalecería la capacidad de gasto de los consumidores. Pero a Pekín le preocupa que eso perjudique a sus propios exportadores, que son esenciales para la creación de empleos.

China también podría bajar las tasas de interés. El Banco Popular de China ha aumentado las tasas de interés cinco veces desde octubre pasado, y es posible que pueda revertir alguna de esas medidas, o todas ellas. Sin embargo, Pekín parece reticente a actuar en ese sentido.

El premier chino, Wen Jiabao, ha repetido que combatir la inflación sigue siendo la prioridad política número uno. Eso sugiere que el curso más probable del banco central es hacer una pausa, y no reducir las tasas. Mientras las presiones sobre los precios sean altas, China actuará de manera conservadora, sin importar lo que el resto del mundo quiera que haga.

"Gran resaca"

Todavía abundan las preguntas sobre cómo se gastó el último fondo de dinero. Pekín alentó a los bancos a prestar libremente a proyectos gubernamentales como ferrocarriles, aeropuertos y caminos. Algunos de los préstamos no han sido devueltos y los defaults de los gobiernos locales ahora plantean una de las mayores amenazas para el crecimiento de China.

Si Pekín tiene que rescatar a esos gobiernos locales, sus bolsillos de pronto no parecerán tan profundos y los problemas del resto del mundo tendrán que esperar.

"Esta vez el rol de China será diferente -dijo Yi Xianrong, un economista de la Academia China de Ciencias Sociales-. China está sufriendo una gran resaca por lo que hizo anteriormente, que creó enormes riesgos en la economía local. El papel que puede desempeñar China hoy es mínimo."

Traducción de Mirta Rosenberg

No comments:

Post a Comment

All comments are welcomed as far as they are constructive and polite.

ChatGPT, una introducción realista, por Ariel Torres

The following information is used for educational purposes only.           ChatGPT, una introducción realista    ChatGPT parece haber alcanz...